In recent years, interest in the problem of expert knowledge has intensified among social scientists. One of the topics more frequently addressed in this context is the relationship between experts and laypeople. This paper examines this issue from the perspective of the concept of epistemic dependence formulated by John Hardwig. I argue that this concept poses a severe challenge to the vision of scientific inquiry dominant in the scientific literature and to the democratic idea of politics. I examine three strategies encountered in the literature for responding to this challenge: individualist, institutional, and epistocratic. Alvin Goldman advocates the first one, as he presents strategies at the disposal of a layman facing two conflicting expert opinions. The second is the belief in the scientific community’s potential to resolve all controversies and protect non-specialists from confronting them. The third is to eliminate epistemic dependence by including only those with sufficient practical experience in expert discussions. In the end, I conclude that the problem of epistemic dependence has no suitable solution. We should place our hopes only with strategies for circumventing it rather than confronting it.

The structure of electricity production in Poland has not changed dramatically recently. Approximately 93% of electricity is currently produced from coal and lignite. Environmental charges have a significantly impact on costs of production. This paper analyses the impact of environmental charges influenced by coal quality on the production cost of power generation. A simulation of the impact of coal quality (Q, A, S) on the environmental charges was carried out. The study was extended by the analysis based on improved relationship between coal quality and emission charges. The calculations included also charges related to the NOx, CO and CO2. The results are presented per 1 ton of coal burned and per 1 MWh of electricity produced.

In the paper, I analyze four types of ontic subordination, which constitute key elements of Ingardenian ontology: heteronomy, derivativeness, non-self‑reliance and dependency. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the concepts constructed by Ingarden are either logically incorrect, or are not sufficiently explained, or refer not to ontic but to semantic relations.

The concept of the existence of the absolute being can be characterized by four criteria which correspond to four existential aspects of the ultimate reality. In volume one of the Controversy over the Existence of the World Roman Ingarden argues that the absolute being is to be characterized as self-sustained, primary, self‑activated and independent. When some general remarks are put aside, the article focuses on arguments that have been adduced by the author in support of three claims. (1) Ingarden accepts the existence of the absolute being and flanks it by additional seven kinds of relative beings. The author finds the abundance supernumerary in the material world. (2) No material (or physical) object possesses properties (or existential moments) that belong to the absolute being. (3) There are fundamental reasons which exclude the possibility that the physical world (the manifold of all material objects) can be identified with the absolute being (absolute existence).

Stanowisko Feuerbacha nazywam antropomorfizmem co do pojęcia Boga, krócej – antropomorfizmem teologicznym. Uznaję je za teorię, i akceptuję. Teza główna tej teorii głosi (w sformułowaniu semantycznym): w każdej deskrypcji „Bóg” (takiej, że jej skrótem jest nazwa „Bóg”) występują wyłącznie wyrażenia dotyczące człowieka. W języku mentalistycznym natomiast (endemicznym Feuerbachowi): nie ma w pojęciu Boga niczego, co wykraczałoby treściowo poza pojęcia dotyczące człowieka. Antropomorfizm Feuerbacha ma wersję słabą oraz wersję mocną. Słaba – pojęcie Boga ma faktycznie feuerbachowską charakterystykę. Mocna – feuerbachowska charakterystyka pojęcia Boga jest konieczna na sposób konieczności przyrodniczej. Wersje te można zespolić, korzystając z dictum znalezionego dla opisu analogicznej sytuacji – ignoramus et ignorabimus. Antropomorfizm Feuerbacha konfrontuję z najmocniejszym argumentem, jaki potrafię sobie wyobrazić – z argumentem wymierzonym w naturalizm, rezerwuar przesłanek Feuerbacha. Argument ten dozbrajam obiecującą ontologią pojęć, zaczerpniętą od Bernarda Bolzano. Pokazuję na koniec, że maszyneria ta nie pracuje, a (niefeuerbachowskie) absolutne pojęcie Boga jest (uwaga: zależność o kontrintuicyjnym przebiegu!) niekonstruowalne, bo nieskonstruowane. W tym położeniu, mając antropomorfizm teologiczny za hipotezę przyrodniczą, czekam cierpliwie (zgodnie skądinąd z postulatem Stratona) na jej obalenie.