Akratic actions are usually defined as intentional actions which conflict with the agent’s best judgement. As both irrational and conscious, actions of that type stand in need of an explanation. In this paper I reconstruct and criticize Donald Davidson’s classical standpoint on the problem of akrasia. I show the disadvantages of Davidsonian conception of practical reasoning and I defend the conception of syllogistic reasoning. I also criticize the theory of intention as unconditional normative judgement. Against Davidson’s view, I argue for the theory of intention as an act of will (not a judgement). According to this theory of intention and practical reasoning, akratic actions should be explained as actions caused by an act of will which conflicts with the best judgement. I propose to interpret the inclination of will to conflict or to follow the best judgement by the theory of habitus.

Elizabeth Anscombe enjoys a unique reputation among philosophers of action. Her Intention is said to have shaped contemporary action theory more often than any other 20th‑century treatise. Indeed, the central claim of Intention – the thesis of intentionalism – is widely accepted today. This thesis asserts that, by necessity, every action is intentional when described in terms of the agent’s intention. In the article, I argue that the widespread interpretation of the thesis of intentionalism differs from Elizabeth Anscombe kontra filozofia działania 17 Anscombe’s interpretation. Intentionalism is typically understood as a metaphysical belief about the structure of action, which differs from what seems to be Anscombe’s real position regarding our default way of understanding agency. According to the interpretation proposed in the text, Anscombe claims that we cannot conceptualize action in any different way than in terms of the agent’s goals.