The article is an attempt to present and discuss – based on the struggle against Barbary pirates and corsairs waged in the Mediterranean Sea – dynamic and complex political and economic processes as well as diplomatic efforts that contributed to the French conquest of Algiers in 1830. The first three decades of the 19th century were among the most turbulent periods in the history of the French nation. Defeated and humiliated by the enemy coalition in 1815, France did not give up on her “imperial dream”, this time trying to make it come true in a non-distant Maghreb. The way to achieve this goal was, however, quite bumpy. At that time, the western part of the Mediterranean Sea was an arena of competition, mainly between the United States and Great Britain. After all, this turned out to be very favourable to France. Wishing to introduce an extra element into the game, eliminate rivals for overseas supremacy, as well as win Russia – that was gradually strengthening her influence in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea – as an ally, at the end of the 1820’s Great Britain became an advocate of her neighbour across the English Channel. Gradually regaining her economic potential and international importance, France reached for Algiers by entering the armed conflict. However, the French stronghold in Maghreb would soon pose a major challenge to the British colonialism in Africa. Expressing their major concern over the security of so-called “imperial route” leading via the Mediterranean sea, British politicians and statesmen adopted a new political stance toward the declining Ottoman Empire. Owing to their “independence and integrity” doctrine (formulated in 1830’s), the rich Ottoman heritage managed to “survive” by the outbreak of World War II.

In the chaotic situation following the British invasion of southern Palestine at the end of 1917, military officials faced several countervailing pressures. In addition to ongoing military priorities (including international norms pertaining to military occupations, such as the law of the ‘status quo’), pressing humanitarian concerns, and even the personal religious sentiments of individual officers, the British occupation administration was forced to take into account international pressures and interventions resulting from the overlapping and conflicting promises made during the war (inter alia, Sykes‑Picot agreement, Husayn‑McMahon correspondence, Balfour Declaration, and President Wilson’s 14 Points). This paper focuses on the land policy‑making process as a case study with which to weigh the various factors pressing upon the military occupation as it evolved during its first three years. Land ownership was a huge concern: a properly functioning land registry was seen as key to the improvement of economic and social conditions in the largely agricultural economy, and British interventions were followed closely by all interested parties. The land has also been at the centre of the ensuing century‑long conflict between Arabs and Jews. Thus, a close examination of land policies (and especially the 1920 land ordinance) offers an extremely important window on both the rule of law in the aftermath of the war and our understanding of the current, unending conflict in the land.

The article discusses the matter of portraying Suleiman I the Magnificent in 16th century Croatian and Slovakian literature. The source material comprises three texts: Ferenc Črnko’s Croatian chronicle titled Podsjedanje i osvojenje Sigeta [The Siege and Capture of Siget], the Croatian epic tale Vazetje Sigeta grada [The Caputure of Siget Town] by Brne Karnarutić and the Slovakian anonymous historical song Píseň o Sigetském zámku [A Song about Siget Castle]. By looking at these texts the author hereof contemplates what image of the Turkish ruler has been recorded in Slavic literatures.