This study examines the causal links between improvements in economic freedom and changes in GDP per capita of new EU members in transition in the period 2000‒2009. The empirical results suggest significant causality running from changes in monetary and fiscal freedom, trade openness, regulation of credit, labour, and business, legal structure and security of property rights, and access to sound money to movements in GDP per capita, especially in less and moderately developed CEE transition countries. Moreover, we find evidence that improvements in economic freedom are one of the main factors stimulating the convergence of these economies towards rich EU members. The evidence of causality in the opposite direction is much weaker.
Dr. Krystyna Skarżyńska from the PAS Institute of Psychology talks about how Poles perceive their freedom.
This article analyses the amendments of January 2018 to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (INR) of 1998, which has raised doubts in light of in ternational law and provoked diplomatic tensions between Poland on one side and Germany, Ukraine, United States of America and Israel on the other. The INR is a national in stitution whose role is, among others, to prosecute perpetrators of in ternational crimes committed between 1917-1990. The article proves that the wording of the amendments is in consistent with in ternational law, as it ignores the principles of in ternational responsibility, definitions of in ternational crimes, and disproportionately limits freedom of expression. In consequence, it cannot be expected that third states will cooperate with Poland in the execution of responsibility for violation of the newly adopted norms.
In this study, effects of political stability, economic freedom and trade freedom of above-stated Fragile Five Countries consisting of Brazil, Indonesia,India, Turkey, and South Africa on the performance of FDI appeal was analyzed with first generation panel data analysis method for the 1996-2017 period. The cointegration analysis between series was conducted by means of Kao (1999) and Pedroni (2004) test. The analyses showed that political stability and trade freedom have a significant positive coefficient on the Fragile Five Countries’FDI. It was also determined that the impact of economic freedom on FDI was statistically insignificant. Thus, it was concluded that the most important determinant of FDI entry into countries is political stability. Error correction mechanisms of models have been working well. In addition, it was found that political stability, economic freedom, and trade freedom are the cause of foreign direct investment in the long-run.
The main aim of the essay is to examine three philosophical narrations. One of them, Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, clearly inspired the other two, that is: Marx’s reflections in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the interpretation of the Odyssey in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Whereas Hegel’s dialectic opens a perspective of mutual recognition of individuals, permanently codified in their fundamental rights, the two remaining narrations lead to totally different conclusions. According to young Marx, the subjects not only do not recognize themselves mutually but even, under the influence of economic relationships, treat each other with disregard. Also in Adorno and Horkehimer’s view the labor processes, which according to Hegel led towards the freedom of individuals, distort interpersonal relations and strengthen the growing coercion. At the end, the proposal of Jürgen Habermas is taken into consideration. He argues that communication acts instead of labor processes are the real emancipating factor.
The article confronts key notions framing our understanding of modernity, such as rationality, knowledge, freedom and democracy, opening the space of a critical interpretation undermining the superficial take on modernity as an embodiment of integrity, putting together the noble principles of knowledge and liberty. Drawing on the thought of Max Weber, exploring the symbolism of his metaphor of “iron cage of rationality”, the article emphasizes a paradoxical sense of the experience of modernity. In concluding statements it defies and calls into question a standard reading of democracy, viewed as an embodiment of freedom and rational self-definition.
This article is an attempt to look at how individual freedom is realized in the world of consumption. Consumer freedom understood as a social relationship – and not for example as a gift received from God and the ability to make independent choices between good and evil according to one’s free will – is not a given once and for all. In the case of consumer freedom, some people have this type of freedom, while others are deprived of it, which often results in moral evil. Freedom in a world where ‘a menu replaces the Decalogue’ is first and foremost a freedom to consume, a freedom of those who have the appropriate material means to make use of them. Therefore, it is not a gift given once and for all, but it requires from us – free consumers – constant activity in acquiring funds that allow us to meet the needs of ownership. It only pretends to be accompanied by freedom of choice but in fact is not. Freedom in the world of consumption is implemented mainly in the sphere of everyday life practice and it does not constitute the implementation of any lofty philosophical ideas. It is an impoverished form without proper theoretical foundation. The problem is whether in the world of consumption there is any freedom at all. Unfortunately, most often we only have an illusion of freedom, because choosing to participate in it (more or less consciously), we agree to its prevailing rights. One of the most important rights in the domain of consumption implying is freedom of consumption, or ironically speaking, the free-dom to choose between Coca Cola and Pepsi. But even in its narrow application consumer freedom does not seem to realize any moral good. It is true that various attempts are being made to codify the ethical activity of consumers, traders, producers, etc., but this has nothing to do with the real moral dimension of actions, concerning instead instrumental and performative aspects of those actions by sustaining unreflective choice automatisms.
Active suspension systems ease the conflict between comfort and handling. This requires the use of suitable actuators that in turn need to be efficiently controlled. This paper proposes a model-based control approach for a nonlinear suspension actuator. Firstly the concept is derived in the linear framework in order to simplify the synthesis and analysis phase. There a linear model of the actuator is proposed and discussed. Further, this design phase includes a comparison between model-free PID controllers and a newly proposed two-degree-of-freedom controller which allows one to shape reference and disturbance responses separately. Subsequently, the two-degree-of-freedom controller, which proves to be superior, is adapted to the nonlinear framework by considering a linear parameter varying representation of the nonlinear plant. Finally, the nonlinear controller is implemented in a test car confirming the concept applicability to real hardware.
The author of the article is aimed at reconstructing the concept of academic freedom as a base of university existence, regarding both its didactic and research function. The author takes into account various definitions of academic freedom and analyzes areas and dimensions, especially its institutional (university) and individual (professor) level. He reconstructs also controversies which are exposed in discussions on academic freedom and arguments regarding its limitations. He considers the phenomenon of actuarial policy and various forms of academic competition. He puts question: does the concept of academic freedom can be still vivid in the time of growing commercialization of didactits and research functions of contemporary university as well as its growing dependance on economy and politics?
In the article I present and criticize the view of classical compatibilism on freedom, i.e. the view according to which free subjects and free actions can exist in the world ruled by universal, exceptionless causality. I claim that compatibilism does not solve the problem of freedom and determinism, but avoids and disregards it. Compatibilism pretends to accomplish the task by playing with semantic tricks that create a misleading impression of ‛compatibility’.
In his philosophical commentary to the thought of Karl Marx, Leszek Kołakowski refers to his assimilation of G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy. He pays particular attention to the swinging of Hegel’s theory ‘the right side up’ and standing him on a pair of feet instead of the head. Marx undertook the difficult task of ensuring a unity of man in a way quite different from the attempts made by either Kant or Hegel. They all wanted to abolish the contingency in human life, but in Marx’s thought the abolishing of the contingency is nothing else but a subjecting of a human being to his/her own existence. A man is no longer dependent on alienated forces that he has created himself, neither is he dependent on an anonymous society. Taking clue from Kołakowski we can say that exteriorisation of natural forces has replaced exteriorisation of consciousness and the Absolute Being of man is realized in his/her actual being.
The article aims to briefly present Peter Strawson’s view expressed in his seminal article Freedom and Resentment (1962). We start with certain remarks on the position of the article among other works by Strawson and on reasons of its vast popularity manifested by many modern authors interested in the issues of responsibility or free will. Next, we move on to the issue of interpretation of the central thought of Strawson’s work. To do this, we present the most common interpretation, which at the first glance seems to express the core of Strawson’s view in a fairly convincing way. Then we adopt a slightly different perspective on the main line of reasoning in the article in question and in this context we try to interpret its general message. We argue that the main topic of the article is the philosophical issue of punishment. For this is the problem which – if we are right – is the proper object of the debate between an optimist who is also a compatibilist and a pessimist who is also a libertarian.
Freedom and Resentment (1962), written by Peter Frederick Strawson, is one of the most influential papers in 20th century investigations regarding the problem of free will. An interesting criticism of that work was proposed by his son, Galen Strawson, who analyzed and rejected his father’s view, called the theory of reactive attitudes. In my paper I reconstruct the views of Peter Strawson and present counterarguments put forward by Galen Strawson. In the summary I suggest, following Robert Kane, that the disagreement may reflect some important changes in analytic philosophy.
The aim of the following paper is to compare the female protagonists of Honoré de Balzac’s novel that dates back to 1842. The comparison is drawn in the context of two philosophical notions which are in opposition: volonté, understood as intent and desire to achieve goals or realize passions, and liberum arbitrium representing the free will to make conscious personal decisions. Mrs de l’Estorade, alias Renée de Maucombe, is the most conspicuous example of a character, who seems to be driven by social determinism. However, this assumption is paradoxically far from truth because the actions she takes reflect the principles of liberum arbitrium. The epistolary form of the novel complements the analysis of the aforementioned concepts. It allows the women to give vent to their feelings and explain the reasons behind their choices.
In pursuing any kind of scientific activity, we pose a certain problems, and seek solution of them by various methods; as a result, we form our own judgements on the matter to which the given problem pertained, and finally make public this judgement, which is a solution of the problem posed, in conjunction with the relevant evidence. Freedom to pursue science thus requires freedom in each of the four fields mentioned above; that is the individual pursuing scientific activity must enjoy freedom to choose problems, freedom to choose a method, i.e., the means whereby he/she solves his/her problems, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890–1963), a philosopher of science analyses here all these four “freedoms”, as well as considers both the extent to which each of them is indispensable to the successful advance of science and the extent to which a limitation on them can be justified on other grounds.
The subject of this article is an analysis of the earliest of Karl Marx’s articles, Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction. The essence of his views presented in that article was to protest against the restriction of the right to free expression of opinions by journalists. Marx pointed out that the new Prussian Censorship Instruction only seemed to liberalize censorship, but in fact in many aspects tightened the rules, for example, reinforced those that pertained to religious criticism. He thought that the Prussian Censorship Instruction was not an enactment of law, because by limiting freedom, lawmakers acted against the essence of the press, law and state. Marx thought that a press law was needed to guarantee freedom of the press and that censorship should be abolished entirely.