Abstract
This article provides an overview of “memory laws” in Europe, reflecting upon what may
be called the “asymmetry” of such laws. It then looks at the special case of Poland and its
troubled experience with memory laws; it considers the question of whether, in the eyes of
the law – genocide, and in particular the Holocaust – is so “special” that its public denials
warrant legal intervention. It also looks at the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights and its (not necessarily coherent) “doctrine” on memory laws and their consistency, or
otherwise, with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (and in particular with freedom of expression as laid down in Art. 10).
The article concludes by asserting that even if we take the law as an indicator of European
public memory, there is no consensus on the past, except perhaps for the special case of the
Holocaust. The main challenge lies in determining whether memory laws, defined by some
as social engineering and the imposition of “imperative” versions of memory, are consistent
with the principles inherent in open, democratic and free societies in Europe. This challenge
remains unmet.
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Authors and Affiliations
Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias