In 1995, Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski added a Dissenting Opinion to the East Timor Judgment, wherein the ICJ declined jurisdiction in a proceeding started by Portugal against Australia for its having concluded the East Timor Gap treaty with Indonesia, in blatant violation of the East Timorese’s right to self-determination. Ad-hoc Judge Skubiszewski posited that the Court should have accepted jurisdiction and he presented a series of convincing arguments for this proposition. In 2019 the ICJ rendered an Opinion in the Chagos Islands case. The fact that the ICJ accepted jurisdiction in this case demonstrates that an impressive development has taken place since 1995, one whereby many of Professor Skubiszewki’s requests have been implemented. At the same time however, the Chagos Opinion is not fully satisfying as it neglects, to a considerable extent, the human rights issue. This contribution shows that Skubiszewski’s Dissenting Opinion would have provided guidance also for these questions and that it remains as topical today as it was in 1995.
The article offers a revisited look at the classic jurisprudence of the ECtHR and CJEU concerning the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from the perspective of the phenomenon of judicial dialogue. In this context, it aims to examine whether judicial dialogue contributes to the development of coherent jurisprudence and in consequence of effective judicial redress in cases involving unrecognised entities and individuals. It draws attention to the threats for both the international rule of law and the protection of rights of individuals resulting from inconsistencies within own jurisprudence of the respective court, as well as from lack of coherence in interpretation and application of the same rules of international law by different courts.
As many as three international disputes containing allegations of infringement of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination (ICERD) have been brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), thus contributing to the number of cases allowing the Court to pronounce itself on the international human rights law. Even though none of the cases invoking violations of ICERD has been (yet) adjudicated on the merits, they have already provided an opportunity to clarify (at least in part) the compromissory clause enshrined in Art. 22 of ICERD, as well as to tackle some other issues related to provisional measures ordered by the Court. This article discusses the ICJ’s approaches to the application of ICERD in the three above-mentioned cases, while posing the question whether indeed the 1965 Convention can be useful as a tool for settling inter-state disputes. The author claims that ICERD and the broad definition of “racial discrimination” set out in its Art. 1 constitute cornerstones for the international protection of human rights, though the recourse to the procedures provided in Art. 22 of ICERD – vital as they are – should not necessarily be perceived as a better alternative to the inter-state procedures and the functions exercised by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).