The text discusses Roger Scruton’s most important philosophical views. Scruton was a conservative whose world view was firmly grounded in the Anglo-Saxon philo-sophical tradition. At the same time, he was a man of versatile interests (aesthetics, music, architecture, ecology), which was reflected in his rich creativity. He was a critic of all leftist and liberal ideologies, so he rejected both the liberal meaning of freedom and socialist meaning of equality. He understood freedom as an element of social bonds and hierarchical order. His philosophy revolves around such categories as property, natural justice, common law and oikophilia, on which he bases his ecological project („green philosophy”). Scruton’s texts also contain elements of conservative political practice.

This article is devoted to current practices concerning the application of general principles of law in the light of their function in the international legal system. As a means of the application and interpretation of both treaty and customary law, general principles of law perform a crucial function in the system of international law, which is understood as set of interrelated rules and principles – norms. The role played by general principles of law in the international legal order has been discussed by academia for years now. Initially they were used to ensure the completeness of the system of international law. However, at the current stage of development of international law, when many of them have been codified, they are usually invoked by international courts for the interpretation of treaties and customary law and/or the determination of their scope. This means that despite their ongoing codification they do not lose their character as general principles and are still applied by international courts in the process of judicial argumentation and the interpretation of other norms to which they are pertinent. References by international courts to general principles of law perform the allimportant function of maintaining the coherence of the international legal order, which is faced with the twin challenges of fragmentation and the proliferation of international courts.

The author claims that Marx’s ideas have succeeded, the proletariat has been victorious in the class conflict but the victory is completely different from what Marx has expected. The vision of the proletariat state ended up in a total failure. The vestiges of Marx’s proposal testify to complete inapplicability of his main ideas to the circumstances of the contemporary world. The concept of a state managed by the proletariat class turned out to be defective. The ownership of the means of production has failed. The concept of private property defended itself and has even been strengthened. And where a public ownership won the upper hand, as in State Treasury, it turned out to be institutional and not collective. Moreover, the state interferes more and more vigorously in private businesses and their activities. On the other hand, however, the proletariat succeeded in the area of employment law where it won some durable legal guarantees. Thus Marx correctly perceived certain needs of the proletariat but proposed inapt solutions to them.

The article provides a general overview of environmental protection and conservation practice in the Antarctic Treaty area, with special reference to the stipulations of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection and its Annexes.

Freedom of research is one of the fundamental principles upon which the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) was founded. Its scope is defined by the limitations imposed by relevant legal rules. They provide among other for prohibition of scientific investigation of military character and declare that no activities — including research — shall constitute a basis for territorial claims in Antarctica. Of particular importance are limitation;' imposed on freedom of research for the benefit of environmental protection. But, contrary to some views, most scholars consider that the freedom of research and the protection of the environment and ecosystems in Antarctica are equally important principles central to the whole ATS. They are inter-dependent and neither one should be attributed priority over the other. In the best interest of science, Antarctic research needs to be controlled to the necessary minimum of environmental impact and risk.

International law reflects systemic conditions compatible with its essence, which means that a space must exist inside the borders of that order for the presence of the phenomenon of general principles. The assumption that international law is a legal system ipso facto means that general principles must exist within its borders. A general principle of law is a necessary element of every legal order. It is a form and a tool in which the efforts of the individual seeking to comprehend a given phenomenon are materialized through imposing order on it rather than by breaking it down into unconnected and independent elements. Since law is an expression of order, law therefore applies general principles. The systematicity of law, and therefore of international law as well, creates the primary source of the binding force of any norm. Considerations of natural law or positive law justifications for the presence of general principles in international law are of little consequence, as the source of general principles is the systemic nature of the law. Order and hierarchy are part of the rationalized system in which norms of law present themselves. This dependency applies also to norms of international law. The role of the judge is to fill in the appropriate normative content (general principles) in fields constituting at one and the same time both a necessary element and a consequence of the systemic character of the international legal order. Within this context the principle of good faith constitutes one of the bases for considerations concerning the extent of the international legal order. The extent of international law reaches as far as the extent to which evidence of good faith are present among the subjects of international law. The impossibility of describing relations between two states by the use of the determinants of good faith, translated in turn into a normative general principle, determinates the limits of international law.

The paper presents the description of structure and the selected problems of the technical condition, as well as the strength analysis of the thin-walled reinforced concrete shell which has been making a covering of the main hall of the Gdynia Seaport Building through the last 80 years. The rectangle projection of four single curvature shells of the dome was shaped out of mutual perpendicular intersection of two cylindrical shells.

The analysis of the state of stress and deformations was carried out using the special model worked out in MES considering the combination of loads, the thermal ones included. For the long lasting loads (the deadweight of the dome), the computed results of static quantities were confronted with analytical results obtained according to F. Dischinger’s method. This method had been applied by the DYWIDAG Company in Berlin and its branch in Katowice (Poland) who designed the Gdynia Dome.

The computational analysis and the assessment of the technical state, along with laboratory pH tests of concrete, made it possible to carry out the overall evaluation of durability and safety of operation of the Gdynia Seaport Dome through the next decades.

This commentary on the Court of Justice’s ruling in the Pawlak case concentrates on questions of the judicial application of EU law, in particular EU Directives. On the basis of the recent jurisprudence of the Court the authors present three issues: 1) the incidental effects of EU law for the procedural provisions of Member States; 2) the inability to rely on an EU directive by a member state’s authority in order to exclude the application of national provisions which are contrary to a directive; 3) the limits of the duty to interpret national law in conformity with EU law from the perspective of the Court of Justice and the referring court. Further, the article presents the judicial practice of the Polish Supreme Court, and in particular the follow-up decision of this Court not only taking into the account the ruling of the ECJ but also showing how the limitation of a conforming interpretation can be overcome in order to give full effect to EU law. In the authors’ view, this case is worth noting as an example of judicial dialogue in the EU.

In contrast to Antarctica, the Arctic was for a long time deprived of an adequate system of multilateral international scientific cooperation. That gap was filled in 1990 by the foundation of a non-governmental International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). In this article, the origin, structure, operation and perspectives of that Committee are presented.

Ice constitutes physically, but not legally, a separate element of polar regions, alongside with land, water and air. Lack of clear legal regulations in this respect compells the practitioners to apply often inadequate analogies. The specific status of polar permanent and floating ice calls for urgent and comprehensive legal regulation under general international law, the law of the sea and the law of polar regions, on the ground of the principle of Arctic sectors in the Northern Hemisphere and the Antarctic Treaty System in the Southern Hemisphere, with reference to the relatively rich legal doctrine, discussed in detail below.

Polar stations became subject of keen interest of law-makers as the most effective manifestation of human activities in Antarctica. Legal procedures governing the establishment and regulations on operation and decommission of Antarctic stations are presented in this paper.

Given the whole spectrum of doubts and controversies that arise in discussions about laws affecting historical memory (and their subcategory of memory laws), the question of assessing them in the context of international standards of human rights protection – and in particular the European system of human rights protection – is often overlooked. Thus this article focuses on the implications and conditions for introducing memory laws in light of international human rights standards using selected examples of various types of recently-adopted Polish memory laws as case studies. The authors begin with a brief description of the phenomenon of memory laws and the most significant threats that they pose to the protection of international human rights standards. The following sections analyse selected Polish laws affecting historical memory vis-à-vis these standards. The analysis covers non-binding declaratory laws affecting historical memory, and acts that include criminal law sanctions. The article attempts to sketch the circumstances linking laws affecting historical memory with the human rights protection standards, including those entailed both in binding treaties and other instruments of international law.

This article discusses the classical question whether general principles of law form a separate source of international law. To this end it adopts the method of a posteriori analysis, examining the normative nature of various principles of law one by one. This analysis leads to the conclusion that only some principles have a normative nature, while others lack it.