The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility is now much better recognized and more widely discussed in Poland than before. The year 2018 was legislatively the first year in which, according to the directive of the European Union, large and medium- sized enterprises became obliged to report their CSR strategies or to explain the reasons of non-compliance. The article, referring to the existing literature on the subject and ongoing discussion, looks for the possibility of such cultural involvement of enterprises which would be an integral part of their social responsibility.
The goal of the article is the description and analyze of the exclusions of the maritime carrier’s liability, regulated in international conventions, known as the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules. Their construction is basically different and indicates, that their creators had quite the opposite approach in the way of regulation of the negative scope of maritime carrier’s liability.
In the article it has been compared each exclusion of liability in both conventions, especially with the consideration of the genuine differences with the carrier’s scope of liability. It has been analyzed the examples of the real cases, that have been ruled on the grounds of the maritime carrier’s liability. It has been also take a try to evaluate if the court’s sentence would be the same on the grounds of both conventions, or rather would be different.
The aim of the article is to show the dependence of what is our/mine and Other/Alien in thinking about conflicts around investment projects. Investments related to the development of space and resources of the Earth, especially if they cause any (real or potential) changes, generate negative emotions which often become the embers of conflict.
Paradoxically, participation in such conflict may benefit the parties involved. Positive outcomes include: meeting needs (attention and significance), fulfilling (new) social roles, learning about other points of view, finding themselves in new social groups or embedded in local communities. Living in the social theater of life, each person plays different roles, which can lead to tension and a sense of ambivalence. In this situation, the individual has a sense of identity dispersion, being able to be simultaneously in several groups opposing each other. The conflict surrounding the Orzesze mining project can serve as an example here. This and other examples show that what is mine and the Other/Alien, with all its separateness, is, however, more or less intertwined with each other. So, the phenomenon of mutual dependence between the Other/Alien and conflict can provide an interesting perspective when looking at conflicts in managing the space and resources of the Earth. Conflicts, in particular mining-related ones, are an extremely complex phenomenon with great potential – both negative and positive. The appreciation of the benefits mentioned in the article, which result from the mutual dependence of the parties involved in the conflict along with their readiness to go outside their comfort zones, provide an opportunity for mutual understanding and reaching agreement which could lead to a positive change consistent with the idea of sustainable development.
In this complex situation, the incorporation of not only sociological but also psychological aspects becomes an important element of the states’ and companies’ resources policy and cannot be neglected any more.
Karl Marx (and also Friedrich Engels, by the way) was – contrary to his own opinion – an author of several utopias which played a role in the 20th century. The question (which is of both historical-philosophical and historical-empirical character) therefore arises how important this role was. The author focuses on the characteristics of Marxian utopias, and specifically – on their axiological content and current relevance. According to the author, Marx’s utopias can be a convenient starting point for searching for various projects (political, economic, technological etc.) necessary to cope with global challenges that mankind faces in our time. The author is also considering Marx’s motives for a critical approach to utopias and points to those of them which in his opinion should be accepted, while distinguishing them from others which should be rejected.
The article aims to briefly present Peter Strawson’s view expressed in his seminal article Freedom and Resentment (1962). We start with certain remarks on the position of the article among other works by Strawson and on reasons of its vast popularity manifested by many modern authors interested in the issues of responsibility or free will. Next, we move on to the issue of interpretation of the central thought of Strawson’s work. To do this, we present the most common interpretation, which at the first glance seems to express the core of Strawson’s view in a fairly convincing way. Then we adopt a slightly different perspective on the main line of reasoning in the article in question and in this context we try to interpret its general message. We argue that the main topic of the article is the philosophical issue of punishment. For this is the problem which – if we are right – is the proper object of the debate between an optimist who is also a compatibilist and a pessimist who is also a libertarian.
Freedom and Resentment (1962), written by Peter Frederick Strawson, is one of the most influential papers in 20th century investigations regarding the problem of free will. An interesting criticism of that work was proposed by his son, Galen Strawson, who analyzed and rejected his father’s view, called the theory of reactive attitudes. In my paper I reconstruct the views of Peter Strawson and present counterarguments put forward by Galen Strawson. In the summary I suggest, following Robert Kane, that the disagreement may reflect some important changes in analytic philosophy.
Jak to możliwe, że Bóg pozwolił na istnienie i działanie Auschwitz-Birkenau i Kołymy? Jak może ze spokojem patrzeć na Morze Śródziemne, które staje się grobem dla tysięcy Jego dzieci? Skąd pochodzi zło i czy Bóg jest na nie obojętny?
The paper focuses on two research objectives. First, it aims to critically examine a reductio ad absurdum argument against incompatibilism whose main themes can be found in Peter F. Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment. The doubts raised about the argument are inspired by a thought experiment based on fictitious Ludovico’s technique described in Anthony Burgess’s novel A Clockwork Orange. The second objective consists in outlining a version of the compatibilist stance – the version which is immune to Strawson’s objections against the traditional rendering of compatibilism and enables deeper understanding of various possible interpretations of the controversy between compatibilists and their opponents. The proposed position includes a hypothesis on the function of the attitude of participation and the expressivist explications of the concepts crucial for the practice of ascribing moral responsibility. The important feature of the analyses in question is the central role of the states of mind whose content are plans for reactive moral sentiments.
The aim of the article is to examine the specific properties of language actions in terms of their moral evaluation. The author starts from the question whether responsibility for words has the same meaning as responsibility for a physical action. In her analysis, the author deliberates whether in both cases the same rules and criteria are applicable. Referring to the classical theory of speech acts proposed by John L. Austin, who introduced a fundamental division into constative and performative utterances and went on to distinguish illocutionary effects from perlocutionary consequences of speech acts, the author investigates how far a subject is responsible for the words he uses.
Moim zamiarem jest próba zmierzenia się ze standardową koncepcją roli prawnika, która rozstrzyga kwestię potencjalnego konfliktu między tym, co intersubiektywne (moralność instytucjonalna), a jednostkowe (moralność indywidualna), poprzez kształtowanie tożsamości prawnika w oparciu o całkowitą separację życia zawodowego od życia społecznego. Realizując ten cel badawczy, za kluczowe uznałem przedstawienie standardowej koncepcji roli zawodowej prawnika jako dominującej w amerykańskim systemie prawnym, opartym na kontradyktoryjnym modelu procesu karnego.
The paper’s authors undertake the reflection on the stages of the evolution of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s views on the Church and its role as it is played in the lives of its singular members and in the context of the Reformation’s ethical heritage. One can distinguish among three stages of the Bonhoefferian ecclesiology, deepening his vision of the Church. As far as the first one is considered, the Church is defined as the spiritual community of believers, outside of which salvation is impossible. At the second stage the German theologian accentuates the sinfulness of man as a member of the Church. Its recognition constitutes the basis for the transformation that can take place in the human individual due to accepting Christ into oneself. The third stage is stepping into the world of „before-final” matters in the full responsibility for the choices made by particular members of the ecclesial community. The Church, as Bonhoeffer saw it, was supposed to support itself on strong pillars: on freedom, personal responsibility, imitating Christ, neighbourly love, on sacraments and Gospel. In this aspect Bonhoeffer was the faithful continuator of the Reformation program.
The article discusses the rules for judicial proceedings in cases for the establishment and distribution of a fund for limiting liability for maritime claims as they are set out in the Maritime Code and the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC 1996). The author presented the basic convention principles regarding the constitution of the fund and related effects as well as the issue of their interpretation and application in national law of selected countries parties of the convention. The article discusses the regulation of the main stages of the fund proceeding in the Polish civil procedure.
The article presents Peter F. Strawson’s remarks on the free will debate, which he has presented in the essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Strawson avoids taking a stance on the question whether the thesis of determinism is correct. Instead he shows the essential difficulties and far reaching consequences of acknowledging this thesis. He recognizes the inseparable connection between freedom and responsibility in the philosophy after Kant. He consequently questions whether we really understand what it would mean to claim that determinism is true. He focuses on what he calls ‘reactiv attitudes’ triggered by the way in which other people behave toward us. Their behavior evokes emotional reaction in us – gratitude, respect, curiosity, but also distrust, resentment, disappointment. Those emotional responses are not purely subjective and they underlie moral judgments and complicated interpersonal relations. We suspend our reactive attitudes towards animals, very small children or people that we think are mentally ill. Instead we adopt objective (psychiatric, scientific) attitudes towards them. But to acknowledge the thesis of determinism implicates that we should treat all people this way. The paper is not so much concerned with an analysis of advantages and weak points of Strawson’s version of compatibilism, but focuses instead on the originality of his contribution to the debate on free will and on his brilliant treatment of reactive attitudes.
W artykule zestawiam ze sobą i zarazem oceniam dwa zupełnie odmienne sposoby ujmowania rzeczywistości moralnej. Immanuel Kant stworzył nie tylko bardzo wymagającą, ale zarazem zawiłą, sztuczną i nieempiryczną etykę. W dodatku jest ona mocno obciążona metafizycznie, a nawet teologicznie. Natomiast Peter Strawson w artykule z 1962 roku dokonał naturalistycznego i realistycznego opisu rzeczywistości moralnej.