@ARTICLE{Hołówka_Jacek_Neutral_2022,
 author={Hołówka, Jacek},
 number={No 4},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={383-419},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2022},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={Bertrand Russell formulated neutral monism by default, unguided by any strong idea of a uniform, monistic world. Apparently he worked under the urge to liberate philosophy from the quarrel between physicalists and idealists. But he did not succeed in defusing the controversy, instead he fanned it with his fresh ideas. He argued that matter was indestructible, that some mental regularities occurred independently of our will, and that they unfold as if guided by natural laws. He claimed that some conscious states were to be interpreted as objective events despite the fact that they were accessible only privately. But the concurrence between physical and mental facts indicated a similarity between the principles that guided them, or pointed to their singular common nature. He did not undertake to defend his unitary theory vigorously and did not claim it was indisputable. Possibly he hoped to find an additional support for his theory some day and this paper responds to this unspoken request.},
 type={Artykuł},
 title={Neutral monism as a case of double‑aspect theory},
 URL={http://www.journals.pan.pl/Content/129820/2022-04-PFIL-24.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2022.143870},
 keywords={the cone of optic observation, the cone of optic self‑presentation, J.C. Eccles, foreshortening, W. James, J. Kim, laws of nature, E. Mach, mental causation, K.R. Popper, R. Rorty, J. Searle},
}