In its history, Poland was usually more oriented to land than to the sea. For many centuries we have not been able to see the opportunities and potential created by the coastal location of our country. In the current strategic documents in Poland, there are also no proper references to the maritime security of the state, although we are a member of both NATO and the European Union. The article presents the creation process in 2015–2017 and the content of a unique document devoted to this issue: Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security, which was born thanks to the efforts of “enthusiasts” of maritime affairs from the Naval Academy, Shipbuilding Council and the Institute of General Józef Haller under the leadership of the National Security Bureau. In the authors opinion, the document is to form the basis for work on the future maritime security strategy of our country, and also become the “engine” of public discussion in Poland on maritime security issues and the effective use of the coastal position of the state for economic development.

‘The special military operation’ conducted by the Russian Federation, including the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in the Black and Azov Seas carried out by its Black Sea Fleet, meets the definition of aggression, which, in addition to violating the UN Charter, also violates the provisions of UNCLOS (Article 301) and the San Remo Manual (general provisions, first three sections). The unilateral announcement (through a navigational warning) of an ‘anti-terrorist operation’, and in fact a sea blockade of Ukrainian ports, is contrary to the content of UNCLOS (freedom of navigation) and does not meet the requirements for methods of fighting at sea (sea blockade, zones - San Remo Manual).
The missile attacks on civilian and protected objects located on the territory of the Ukrainian state, carried out by ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as artillery and missiles shelling of coastal towns, constitute a gross violation (war crime) of the international humanitarian law of armed conflicts (San Remo Manual). On contrary, the use of unmanned surface vehicles (drones) by the Ukrainian side in the arak on the Sevastopol base is in accordance with the provisions of the Manual (means of warfare at sea). Particular attention in the discussed armed conflict deserves art. 35 (c) UNCLOS relating to the Turkish Straits, which allows Turkey (based on the Montreaux Convention) to significantly influence the strategic and operational situation in the Black Sea by denying the use of the straits to warships (Turkey closed them to warships all flags). The voting procedure for informal members of the UN Security Council should be considered ineffective, which in the discussed case, when the aggressor is a state – a permanent member of the Security Council makes it difficult to apply measures provided for by international law against it and forces the use of ad hoc solutions, such as ‘grain corridors’.

The author analyses legal issues of naval presence in the world ocean in the context of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) in terms of striking balance between doctrines of freedom of the sea and restricted access.

Military operations at sea remain to be prominent. UNCLOS does provide for naval presence in the world ocean as it isessential not only for defense and protection of interests of coastal nations, but also to perform their treaty obligations. The burden to enforce law and order at sea rests on large naval fleets and it remains to be so in foreseeable future.

The Arctic takes in part of Russia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Alaska (USA), Greenland (an autonomous Danish territory), Iceland and the Arctic Ocean, which is covered with ice and constitutes the center of the Arctic. There have been disputes between Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the USA concerning the borders o f the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean. The author describes the achievements of the Russian expedition, “Arctic 2007, ” and the way in which Russia uses the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. The essay also describes how the convention regulates the problem of the border of the continental shelf. He considers that in the future it may come to the partitioning of the Arctic Ocean’s continental shelf, along with the simultaneous fixing of “concessions” allowing the use of shipping lanes in the Arctic by the international community.

International armed conflicts in the twenty-first century will not be limited only to terrestrial territories of the opposing forces. Seas will not only be used for long term dislocation and concentration of forces, but will again become a theater o f war operations. Future armed conflicts will have a significant impact on international shipping activities since 90% of world trade is conducted via maritime shipping. Thus, it can be concluded that all the countries of the world are deeply dependent on undisturbed and free shipping trade. In this article, the author focuses on the issue of protecting neutral shipping. Naval war law and maritime neutrality are issues described by recognized legal frameworks that apply to international conflicts at sea. They do, however, have a number of deficiencies, which renders difficult the effective protection of neutral shipping from the negative impacts of war. One of the problems is the scope of the application of the maritime neutrality law. Another problem is the lack of the obligation of a neutral country to execute the necessary monitoring with the aim of preventing its citizens from cooperating with one or all of the parties to the conflict. Additionally, the warring parties will rarely be able to identify the real character of a cargo ship. The will in the international community to codify naval war law and maritime neutrality will be lacking in the near future.

From the announcement of the Independence by Ukraine in 1991 and signing many bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation on the state border, the joint use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait, until the annexation of the Crimea in 2014, both parties did not manage to carry out maritime distractions on these waters, due to different positions. After the annexation of the Crimea, the situation became beneficial for FR, because in its hands there was a Kerch Strait and the Russian side started the economic blockage of Ukrainian ports on the Azov Sea. The Ukrainian site, wanting to increase the number of its ships in the Berdyansk base located on this sea, decided to move through the sea team consisting of 2 artillery cutters and a subsidiary (tug) belonging to the Navy of Ukraine. During the approach to Kerch Strait, an incident occurred on November 25, 2018 between Ukrainian ships and the ships of the border service of the Federal Security Service (shelling, detention of the ships, arrests and putting their crews before the court). The above action was inconsistent with international law violating Articles 32, 58, 95 and 96 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its judgement ordered RF to give back the ships and send seamen to Ukraine. The warrant was performed partially: ships were returned, while seafarers returned as part of the exchange of prisoners between the parties. Currently, Russia continues to run the economic blockage of the Ukrainian ports, closing (due to military exercises) approaches to the Kerch Strait for ships and vessels of other countries. The current situation indicates that Russia implements its geopolitical goals and disregards the provisions of international law of the sea.

Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) aims to regulate maritime safety in general, it omits terrorism at sea, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal immigration, intelligence gathering and vessel traffic monitoring. The Convention excludes intelligence exchange on illegal activities at sea such as piracy, terrorism, human and narcotics trafficking, illegal fishing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. UNCLOS does however operate as a framework convention since it provides infrastructure upon which UN agencies may take specific measures to address particular problems. For instance, UNCLOS serves as foundation for 80 legal documents in the fields of environmental protection and safety management.

As maritime safety issues are of common interest, multinational cooperation is inevitable. Common good, the author argues, should take precedence over particular interests of nations.

This article is a first endeavor into Polish defense policy matters by Polish Academy of Sciences’ Maritime Law.

Among the signatories of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) there are 9 states bordering the Baltic Sea. Presently the friendly relations between those nations render baltic naval operations less important than far seas operations. This is also true with the Polish Navy.The issue of delimitation of maritime borders and establishment of contiguous zone is of utmost importance to Polish national security. Since 1972 there are ongoing negotiations between Republic of Poland and the Kingdom of Denmark regarding contiguous zones. It is the longest running unresolved border dispute in the Baltic Sea area. There is also a degree of controversy surrounding roadstead of Świnoujście and Szczecin ports located in Bay of Pomerania.The article formulates five conclusions of both general and detailed nature regarding the UNCLOS significance for Poland’s national security.

In an effort to fight terrorism, the author proposes applying the visit and search law not only on the high seas but also in territorial waters. This is a controversial viewpoint as current international law does not permit this law to be applied at all in case of terrorist threats. Additionally, territorial waters come under the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal countries. The full implementation into practice of a common, internationally accepted definition of terrorism should not be anticipated in the nearest future. The author of the article discusses the Rome Convention of 1988 on counteracting illegal acts that threaten the safety of ocean-going vessels, which was laid out following the attack staged by Palestinian terrorists on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985.

The Northern Sea Route is the shortest shipping lane connecting European part of Russia with the Far East and Syberia. The search for a route to China and India, undertaken by the English, Dutch and Russians, went on from mid 16th century until the end of 19th century. Its importance in the present day is exemplified by the traffic: 2007 alone saw 10 million tons of goods shipped along the Route.

The Northern Sea Route is the apple of Russia’s eye. It plays a major part in the Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030, Russia also produced Concept of the Northern Sea Route Development until 2015 and a draft newlaw specifically addressing shipping along it.

A crucial factor in economic feasibility of the route is the state of relations between members of the Arctic Council (the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark), the observer states (Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain and Poland) and the states that requested observer status (China, Japan, South Korea).

The San Remo Manual is not a legal document. It was prepared by a group of experts in the area of naval conflict who took part in a series of round-table meetings between 1988 and 1994. The San Remo Manual is the modern equivalent of the Oxford Manual of the Laws of Naval War (1913) which regulated the relations between hostile forces. The San Remo Manual takes account of international practice, technological development, the content of the UN Charter, the Convention on the Law of the sea (1982), law relating to air traffic, and environmental law. The author of the article discusses the content of the Convention on the law of the Sea from 1982 in relation to the formulations in the San Remo Manual. Since 1995, the San Remo Manual has been obligatory material for training and instruction in the navies of NATO states. It has not yet been translated into Polish.

Piracy is as old as sea-faring itself. For centuries, it accompanied sea-faring on all the navigable seas of the world. Piracy and pirates have lasted to the present day and now constitute a constantly recurring threat. At present pirates operate in straits, in territorial waters, in roadsteads and in sea-ports. A clear majority of states with coastlines combats piracy in their territorial waters with naval forces, with border protection units or with other legally constituted units. The author considers the possibility of using international naval forces to combat piracy in international waters (on the high seas) in the context of the contents of art. 110 and 111 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. The first speaks of the right of inspection and the second of the right of pursuit. This convention provides real possibilities of combating piracy by international naval forces on the high seas. However, the situation is different in relation to combating piracy in coastal waters. The combating of piracy in such waters is impossible until separate agreements can be reached between interested states. One way of legally strengthening the combating of piracy by international armed forces may be the modification of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the concluding of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements among states in the regions where there is a high frequency of pirate attacks.

The use of the seas for military purposes consists of a broad and complex range of activities. We can divide these activities into two categories of users' rights. The first is the right tofreedom ofnavigation, and the second is the right to conduct operational activities. The Navy of a maritime power is the main defender and executive agent ofthese rights. The relations between maritime law and the military exploitation of the oceans, on one hand, 'and maritime law and the structure of power within the international system, on the other hand, are dynamic rather than static ones. They should be considered together in connection with planning for national security. Naval powers have a right to declare that the right to exploit the oceans for military purposes also extends to and beyond exclusive areas of economic

A military danger zone is a specially designated part ofthe open sea, together with the air space above it, which is temporarily or permanently given over to purposes of conducting experiments with new types of weaponry and technology, and to that of training naval forces under conditions that are as close to real ones as possible. Third party states have only limited access to military danger zones, or are forbidden to use them altogether. Officially declaring part of the sea a danger area protects the safety of international maritime navigation and air transport while dangerous military activities are being conducted in that area.

The authors attempted to present the state of disputes regarding the delimitation of marine areas based on a discussion of the practices of countries in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan region. The authors describe the disputes regarding the islands of Senaku (Diaoyu) between both China and Taiwan and Japan and those over the Dokdo (Takeshima) archipelago between the Republic of Korea and Japan. There are many similarities between these two marine territorial disputes. The core of the disputes is land that is devoid of significant economic importance. Due to this, these areas were not previously of interest to coastal countries. They came to the forefront when their location facilitated determining exclusive economic zones. This intensified when evidence of crude oil and natural gas resources was detected in these areas. Tensions eased when geological reports revealed that initial estimates were overly optimistic. The fundamental cause of disputes over archipelagos is that they can be used to determine exclusive economic zones. The problem is compounded when the politicians of Eastern Asia incite historical remembrance. This is especially evident in the cases of Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and China, whose governments are, to some extent, hostages of ultra-nationalistic factions.

The article presents the principles and the organization of supervision and protection of seagoing activities that are applied and enforced by the navies ofNATO member states. Assuming that the most likely kind of conflict in the future will be a regional conflict, characterized by limited range and a fluctuating level of danger, and also by a continuation of commercial maritime activity, NATO has developed appropriate procedures in the area of supervision and protection ofmaritime activity, both during the conflict and in a time of crisis (and of growing crisis). This article discusses contemporary views relating to supervision and protection of maritime activity. It presents the regional system of supervision and protection of maritime activity, its detailed organization, and the principles of its operation. It presents - for the first time in a Polish publication - the issue of supervision and protection of maritime activity developed by NATO.